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A Sliding Scale 
Nuclear Proliferation Among States 
by Jessica Liu 
University of Maryland, College Park 
 
Why do states engage in nuclear proliferation? Nuclear proliferation 
is a major security issue affecting the international arena. Existing studies 
debate both the strength and direction of determinants of nuclear 
proliferation and the effect of domestic and international circumstances 
on proliferation. A clear understanding of why states choose to pursue 
nuclear arms is critical to promoting and maintaining international 
security. By analyzing what factors may make a state less prone to 
proliferation, the international community may incentivize 
disarmament.  My research question considers membership in the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a potential correlate of nuclear 
proliferation. Are countries that are members of the UNSC more likely to 
engage in nuclear proliferation compared to countries that are not 
elected to the UNSC? 
Current scholarly research suggests many factors for proliferation. 
Existing literature cites three types of determinants: technological 
determinants, external determinants, and domestic determinants (Singh 
& Way, 2004, p. 862). States that are more technologically advanced are 
more likely to develop nuclear weapons due to a universal appeal of 
nuclear arms and the reduced costs of acquiring nuclear weapons 
compared to less advanced states (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 862; Jo & 
Gartzke, 2007, p. 167). External determinants, such as perceived security 
threats, cause a state to develop nuclear weapons in order to balance 
against a rival state’s nuclear capabilities or a conventional threat. An 
alliance with a major power, on the other hand, diminishes the probability 
of proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2013, p. 1; Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 185; 
Singh & Way, 2004, p. 863). Some argue that in relation to the democratic 
peace theory, the pacifying effects of democracy and interdependence 
among democratic states reduce the ambition to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Quantitative tests have found that economic integration deters 
nuclear proliferation, because states do not wish to threaten economic 
partners (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 864). 
Scholars have also tested the effects of signing the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on nuclear proliferation, 
though they have reached different conclusions. Jo and Gartzke found 
that while states that have ratified the NPT ratification are less likely to 
initiate nuclear programs, NPT ratification has not deterred proliferation 
at the system level (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 167). However, Bleek and 
Lorber found that NPT ratification is significantly and negatively linked to 
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all stages of proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2013, p. 12). 
To continue the discussion of how different factors affect nuclear 
proliferation, I study how being a member of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) affects a state’s status on nuclear proliferation. I also 
control for NPT ratification and enduring rivalry. The first section of this 
paper states my hypotheses and the rationale behind my predictions. The 
next section explains the construction of the dataset and coding for the 
variables. I then analyze the data using ordered logistic regression and 
discuss my findings. The last section contains a brief overview of 
considerations for future research. 
 
THEORY 
 
As Singh and Way (2004), among other scholars cited above, 
theorize, both external and internal factors affect a state’s decision to 
proliferate. I further examine this by introducing a new independent 
variable, membership in the U.N. Security Council, in a model in 
conjunction with variables studied by other scholars. I adopt Singh and 
Way’s use of a continuum as the dependent variable to separate the 
various stages a state may reach towards proliferation. The different 
stages are: no significant interest in nuclear weapons, serious exploration 
of nuclear weapons, pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 861). 
 
United Nations Security Council 
I analyze the effect of membership in the United Nations Security 
Council on nuclear proliferation. The UNSC is charged with maintaining 
international peace and security and handles many issues relating to 
deterrence (United Nations, 1945). In order to maintain international 
security, members of the council must protect themselves against 
potential aggressors. Thus, I expect elected states to be more likely to 
have at least explored nuclear weapons. In addition, after a state has 
been elected to the UNSC, it is more likely to want to increase its own 
security in order to legitimize its authority as part of the council. It may 
also do so to deter retaliation from other states as a result of the policies 
it helps create and impose. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
States that are members of the United Nations Security Council are 
more likely to engage in nuclear proliferation. 
 
NPT Ratification 
I also measure the effect of ratifying the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons on proliferation. The NPT is 
currently the only multilateral binding agreement dedicated to 
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disarmament. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms 
limitation and disarmament agreement (Unites Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). Although it explicitly prohibits the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, the goal of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons may implicitly discourage the exploration and pursuit of nuclear 
weapons as well. I do not consider the relationship between being a 
signatory of the NPT and acquisition of nuclear weapons in my model 
because of perfect prediction, save for a few violations of the NPT. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
States that have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons are less likely to explore or pursue nuclear weapons. 
 
Enduring rivalry 
Lastly, I analyze whether a state participates in an enduring rivalry 
in any given year. A vast majority of wars and militarized disputes occur 
within enduring rivalries, supporting the argument that the presence of 
an enduring rivalry is a significant security threat (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 
869). A state that has a history of rivalry with another state is more likely 
to sense an urgency to develop nuclear weapons to protect itself. States 
whose rivals possess nuclear weapons are also more likely to develop 
nuclear weapons to defend against a potential preemptive strike. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
States that are involved in enduring rivalries are more likely to 
engage in nuclear proliferation. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dataset is based on that from Singh and Way’s article (2004). 
The unit of analysis, country-year, analyzes 154 countries from 1945-
2000 (Singh & Way, 2004, 861). The dependent variable is the level of 
nuclear proliferation that a state reaches. Because some states may 
express interest in nuclear weapons or start to build nuclear weapons but 
never progress to detonating them, I use Singh and Way’s coding of 
placing proliferation on a continuum from 0 to 3. This accounts for states 
having many possible stopping points while on the path to proliferation. 
0 demonstrates that a state has expressed no interest in nuclear 
weapons, 1 serious exploration of the possibility of developing weapons, 
2 substantial efforts to develop weapons, and 3 acquisition of nuclear 
weapons capability. Exploration is coded for the year a country first 
considers building nuclear weapons, as shown by political authorization 
or research by defense agencies that may oversee potential weapons 
development. Pursuit is defined as when states make an active effort to 
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gain nuclear weapons, such as through a cabinet-level political decision 
or movement toward weaponization. Acquisition is coded from the year a 
country has its first explosion or possession of a nuclear weapon (Singh & 
Way, 2004, p. 866-867). If a country renounces its nuclear weapons, 
subsequent years are coded as 0 to indicate no further interest in nuclear 
weapons. 
Singh and Way break down the level of nuclear proliferation 
variable into separate dichotomous variables for the stages 
of exploration, pursuit, and acquisition. I utilize these to analyze how the 
independent variables affect whether a state achieves each stage of the 
nuclear continuum. Once a country achieves a value of 1 for a stage 
during a specific year, observations for future years under that stage are 
dropped and coded as missing. I employ ordered logistic regression 
because the dependent variable is ordinal. I cluster using country codes 
established by the Correlates of War project, so that observations for 
various years are grouped by country (Correlates of War Project, 2006). 
This accounts for the inherent correlation of observations made within 
the same country. 
 
Independent Variables 
I create a dichotomous variable for the years that a state is elected 
into the UNSC. The dichotomous variable utilizes 0 for non-membership 
during a country-year and 1 for membership. The coding for membership 
in theUnited Nations Security Council is taken from the United Nations 
website (United States Security Council, 2013). Countries are elected for 
two-year terms, although a few countries served on the council for just 
one year in a given period. 
Several countries posed coding challenges. Taiwan, officially known 
as the Republic of China, was originally a permanent member of the UNSC 
until its seat was replaced by the People’s Republic of China in October 
1971 (United Nations Gneral Assembly, 1971). I code Taiwan as a 
member of the UNSC until 1971 and China as a member from 1971 
onwards. Both are coded as 1 in 1971 because each was a member for a 
portion of the year. The United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt and 
Syria, was a member of the UNSC from 1961-1962 (United Nations, n.d.). 
However, it split in October 1961, after which Egypt adopted the original 
name. Syria and Egypt are both coded as members separately in 1961, 
but only Egypt is coded as a member in 1962. 
The data on whether a state is an NPT signatory is merged from a 
dataset created by Jo and Gartzke (2007). The variable is dichotomous, 
with a 0 representing a state that did not ratify the treaty during that year 
and a 1 representing a state that ratified it. The dataset’s observations 
span from 1939 to 1992, while Singh and Way’s observations span from 
1945-2000. When I merge Jo and Gartzke’s data into Singh and Way’s 
dataset, observations prior to 1945 are dropped, and the values for 
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the NPT ratification after 1992 are coded as missing. 
The variable for enduring rivalry is from Singh and Way’s original 
dataset (2004). The presence of an enduring rivalry accounts for a 
significant portion of the security threat facing a state. The authors adopt 
coding from another article by Bennet (1998) and utilize a dichotomous 
variable whose value is 1 if the state is involved in one or more enduring 
rivalries in a given year, and is 0 if not. There are no issues of 
multicollinearity, or correlations of ±0.6 or greater, among the variables 
in my models. Because the variables for exploration, pursuit, and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons are combined into the variable for level of 
nuclear proliferation, there is logically a high correlation of the three with 
the level of nuclear proliferation. To avoid multicollinearity, I perform 
regressions for exploration, pursuit, and acquisition separately from the 
regression on level of nuclear proliferation. The correlation table is 
below:
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Before testing my variables, I explore the distribution of states on 
the nuclear proliferation continuum (Graph 1). This information allows a 
more detailed understanding of the statuses of states on nuclear 
proliferation. Only countries that have at minimum shown interest in 
nuclear proliferation, or that have been coded as 1 or higher for the level 
variable, are analyzed. If a country has reached multiple stages of nuclear 
proliferation, the achievement of each stage is factored into the 
calculations in order to holistically gauge how far countries overall have 
progressed on the continuum. Almost half of the countries studied have 
explored weapons, but less than a third have seriously pursued nuclear 
weapons, and less than a quarter have acquired them. However, these 
observations are limited by their small sample size, as over 90% of 152 
countries in the dataset have shown no interest in domestic nuclear 
programs. 
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Figure 1 
 
Table 1 shows that although hypotheses 1 and 3 hold true, 
hypothesis 2 is proven incorrect. Countries that are members of the 
United Nations Security Council are 2.25 times more likely to achieve a 
higher rating on the level of nuclear proliferation than countries that are 
not members. Countries that experience enduring rivalry are also 
significantly more likely to achieve a higher rating than countries that do 
not have enduring rivalry, although the coefficient is 1.78, which denotes 
a smaller effect than that of the UNSC variable. Both relationships are 
significant because they have a P-value of 0.00. 
Ratification of the NPT has no significant relationship with a state’s 
status on nuclear proliferation. This finding was unexpected because 
states that are resolved against acquiring nuclear weapons may be 
assumed to also be less likely to explore and pursue nuclear weapons. In 
addition, the result challenges the conclusions of Jo and Gartzke (2007) 
and Bleek and Lorber (2013). The disparity may be explained by my 
simplistic model, which has only a few independent variables and focuses 
on external determinants of nuclear proliferation. By adding variables 
such as technological development and economic factors into a future 
model, signatory status may become significant. 
Other explanations for the lack of significance include the 
circumstances surrounding the treaty. Signing the NPT may not 
necessarily change state preferences for exploring or pursuing weapons 
(Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 179). Many treaties are signed as formalities 
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because they represent actions states would have undertaken regardless 
of the presence of the treaty (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996, p. 380). 
In this vein, the NPT may have been ineffective in deterring nuclear 
proliferation because states have agreed to avoid acquiring nuclear 
capability, but may continue to explore and pursue weapons. 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Level of Nuclear Proliferation 
Coefficient 
(R.S.E.) 
P-Value 
Rivalry 1.782 (.476) 0.000 
NPT 
Ratification 
-.495 (.372) 0.183 
UNSC 2.252 (.480) 0.000 
 
Figure 2. Bolded coefficients are significant at the p<0.05 level. 
 
     I disaggregate each stage of proliferation from the variable for 
level of proliferation in order to consider the effects of the independent 
variables on each stage. Before executing the regression, NPT ratification 
seems to reduce the likelihood that the state will explore and pursue 
nuclear weapons (Graph 2). This is in accordance with the belief that 
signing the treaty deters proliferation. However, a logistic regression 
demonstrates that NPT ratification still has an insignificant effect on 
proliferation (Table 2). A near-significant relationship is found between 
exploration of nuclear weapons and ratification of the NPT. States that 
have signed the NPT are -0.90 times less likely to explore nuclear 
weapons, but there is a 6.1% probability of the observed relationship 
being due to chance. I include the independent variables of rivalry and 
UNSC membership in this model in order to take into account their 
explanatory power. The UNSC and rivalry variables stay significant, 
except for the effect of UNSC membership on pursuit, which is just above 
the threshold of significance. 
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Figure 3. 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Exploration Pursuit Acquire 
Coefficient 
(R.S.E.) 
P-
Value 
Coefficient 
(R.S.E.) 
P-Value Coefficient 
(R.S.E.) 
P-
Value 
Rivalry 1.878 (.430) 0.000 2.894 
(.754) 
0.000 2.821 
(1.123) 
0.012 
NPT 
Ratification* 
-.903 (.481) 0.061 -.935 (.658) 0.155 --* --* 
UNSC 1.172 (.451) 0.009 .988 (.577) 0.087 1.690 
(.704) 
0.023 
 
Figure 4. *Npt_rati is omitted due to perfect prediction. The NPT prohibits signatories 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 
To further explore the effect of UNSC membership on state 
behavior, I analyze the differences between members of the UNSC and 
non-members and the average action they take regarding proliferation. I 
utilize the dichotomous variables of whether a state explored, pursued, 
or acquired nuclear weapons to separate the effects for each stage on the 
nuclear continuum. States that have been members of the UNSC show 
higher means of exploration, pursuit, and acquisition (Graph 3). This 
provides additional support for hypothesis 1, and predicts that members 
of the UNSC are more likely to exhibit higher levels of nuclear 
proliferation than states that are not members of the UNSC. 
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Figure 5.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Although nuclear proliferation is a growing concern, there are a 
limited number of nuclear states. Thus, the small sample size of states 
that have acquired nuclear weapons constrains the applicability of my 
findings. In order to limit observations to before the year 2000, I also did 
not code for countries that were elected to the United Nations Security 
Council after 2000. 
 Future studies on proliferation may include an updated dataset in 
order to analyze how states’ attitudes towards nuclear proliferation have 
evolved. Controls, such as whether proliferation occurred during the Cold 
War and geographical region may be added. Motivations to proliferate 
during the Cold War may differ from motivations during other time 
periods due to the global political climate. Different regions may also 
share traits that affect states’ decisions to proliferate. In addition, the 
coding of being a party to the NPT can be modified to include states that 
have acceded or succeeded to the NPT to analyze if a significant 
relationship exists. 
Further research may also help explain why some states back down 
or reverse their decision to proliferate. Some states have voluntarily given 
up their nuclear arsenal or stopped their pursuit and exploration -- no 
longer exhibiting interest in nuclear weapons. A comparison of some of 
the traits of these countries may uncover findings about how to promote 
disarmament. The threat of nuclear warfare and immense consequences 
of unchecked nuclear proliferation demand immediate attention. As the 
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international community works to establish peace and security among 
countries, it must better understand the basis for nuclear proliferation 
before it can successfully promote non-proliferation and global 
disarmament. 
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